US PRESIDENT Barack Obama called the interim nuclear deal with Iran ‘historic’ within two hours of the agreement in Lausanne, Switzerland. Hindsight will arguably prove this true - irrespective of its implementation, writes World Review expert Dr Uwe Nerlich.
It ended a process covering 35 years since the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, 13 years since Iran’s nuclear programme entered the international agenda, followed by 12 years of negotiations.
The five United Nations Security Council members plus Germany - the P5+1 leading global powers - agreed with Iran in 2013 on a joint plan of action, supplemented in 2015 by a framework deal as a basis for a ‘full, comprehensive and detailed agreement’. The Lausanne deal, on April 3, 2015, defined the essentials of that agreement, to be completed by 30 June, 2015.
It is not known for sure what Iran had aspired to - recognition as a threshold country; demonstrate technological prowess or whether it had ambitions originally to acquire nuclear weapons.
But Iran has learned to use its nuclear programme as a major bargaining tool. While the devil tends to be in the detail, failure to achieve this framework agreement would have had far-reaching consequences:
• It would indicate that anti-Western conservatives in Iran had prevailed.
• A ‘better’ deal could not have been achieved. Increasing pressure through sanctions or military coercion would not have been options. Iran could have continued its nuclear programme unrestrained, if it decided to do so, but this would not have served Iran’s recognisable internal or international interests.
• The three non-European powers at the table - China, Russia and the US - would have probably redefined their interests with implications for upholding sanctions on Iran.
• An unrestrained Iran nuclear programme could have triggered competing nuclear activities in the Middle East.
• The shaky non-proliferation regime would have become even weaker.
Achieving the framework agreement means that neither America’s Republican opposition nor Mr Netanyahu can make useful political currency from their continued opposition to the deal.
So, what would Iran’s status be when the final deal is implemented?
Iran would acquire a unique nuclear weapons state status. It would become a nuclear-weapons minus-one year-state which is different from Israel or Pakistan.
This status would have limited duration for Iran - 10 years for constraints, 15 or more years for controls.
The expectation on both sides is that within that timeframe the whole context of the nuclear issue will change.
A mechanism for re-installing sanctions is expected to be involved under conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence, if the deal is not complied with. The costs for Iran would increase rapidly, but also for the deal’s stakeholders in the West and beyond.
This would profoundly change the rationale for both ending the deal and invoking sanctions.
The deal would have two main benefits for Iran, in addition to its new nuclear weapons status. Lifting sanctions meets urgent needs and popular support, but it may take two to three years before Iran's trading capacity is fully restored.
Iran is an oil and gas supplier so lifting sanctions will increase pressure on oil and gas prices and on its competitors, particularly the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
By steeply increasing Iran’s purchasing power and access to financial markets, it will turn Iran into a highly attractive market. European Union exports to Iran are expected to quadruple by 2018 if sanctions are lifted. Iran's economy is expected to grow by five per cent by 2016 and up to seven or eight per cent by 2018.
The Obama Administration has already called for a ‘new era of cooperation’ with Iran which is likely to become a game-changer for the whole region.
President Obama is preparing for a Camp David Summit with all Gulf States this Spring - with positive, though cautious responses from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani responded, in a televised speech on April 3, that the deal is just ‘the start of a broader policy of opening up. We can have cooperation with the world’.
This is bound to have irreversible consequences for Iran's domestic change, and its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has signalled support for the deal and, by implication, for political change.
Turkey and Pakistan have already endorsed Saudi Arabia’s position, broadening the regional agenda for change.
Such change will be supported from the West, and China and Russia, which will compete for access to the region.
The nuclear dimension of competition for regional dominance will recede. Israel will eventually need to redefine its regional interests within a framework which is no longer dominated by alleged fears for its very survival.
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Publication Date:
Tue, 2015-04-21 05:15
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