US-Iran frosty relations opens opportunities for Russia

THE LEVEL of contact between high ranking Washington and Tehran officials in recent months is unprecedented. This intense diplomatic effort has focussed on the P5+1 negotiations involving the permanent members of the UN Security Council - China, France, United Kingdom, United States and Russia, plus Germany - talking with Iran over its nuclear programme and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A successful agreement may foreshadow a warming of relations between Iran and Western powers, expanding perhaps to address common regional security issues, writes Dr James Jay Carafano. That outcome seems like ‘wishful thinking’ at present. Frosty relations with the West, as well as increasing and intractable Middle East security challenges, will become the new normal for the foreseeable future. The United States broke diplomatic relations with Tehran in 1980, after the student-led revolution. Since then, policy differences between the two nations have been innumerable and long-standing. The US Department of State has designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984. The department’s report on human rights practices in Iran lists a litany of concerns. Disclosures concerning the potential development of weapons from Iran’s nuclear programmes and revelations of secret nuclear facilities beginning in 2002, prompted additional international pressure and economic sanctions. Efforts at a rapprochement have waxed and waned over the decades. The election of Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian presidency in 2013 precipitated a renewed round of negotiations with the P5+1. A preliminary agreement between the two sides led to a partial lifting of sanctions with the prospects for a long-term agreement in July 2014. This was not achieved and the parties agreed to extend the deadline for an additional four months. Analysts have suggested that the US and Iran could build a cooperative working relationship based on progress in the talks. ‘At this crossroads, where neither the United States nor Iran can impose its will on the other without incurring unacceptable hardships in return, both sides should see the wisdom of elevating cooperation over confrontation,’ wrote Douglas M. Johnston and Ahmad Iravani for the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy. Their analysis listed a range of issues on which the two powers could cooperate, from Afghanistan to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. US Secretary of State John Kerry suggested in June 2014 that such cooperation could be exploited to address the mushrooming Islamist insurgency in Iraq. There have, however, been few signs of cooperative efforts. In part, closer cooperation with Tehran would be difficult because many US regional allies may interpret these actions as siding with Iran in the Shia-Sunni sectarian confrontation which is becoming an increasingly divisive feature of Middle East geopolitics. What makes cooperation even more unlikely is that the foundation upon which it was to be built, a long-term P5+1 agreement, may never happen. The US lacks leverage to press for an acceptable final deal. Lifting some sanctions, a concession to Tehran for participating in non-proliferation talks, has delivered critical economic relief to the Iranian regime. As it continues to enjoy relief from sanctions, the pressure to negotiate lessens. It will become increasingly difficult to re-establish the sanctions as time passes, as many countries are extremely anxious to do business with Tehran and import Iranian oil. A further complication is Russia’s role in the P5+1 negotiations. Relations between the US and Russia are at their nadir. Russian President Vladimir Putin could well wish to see the US rapprochement with Iran fail and the sanctions regime collapse. The failure of negotiations would be a huge setback for US President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Loosening sanctions against Tehran would offer new economic opportunities which Russia would quickly exploit. What will probably happen is that the extension of the P5+1 negotiations will expire without a final deal. The regime will blame others for the failure of the talks, citing intransigent attitudes towards allowing Iran to retain a sufficient and legitimate capacity to reprocess nuclear fuel. The ambivalent result of the talks, and the ‘finger-pointing’ which will probably follow, will make it difficult to re-establish a full sanctions regime. In addition, Iranian foreign policy will probably become far more assertive in the months following the talks. Expect Iran to develop closer ties with Moscow and a more aggressive role in dealing with the ‘threats’ on its borders in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, expect Iran to revitalise its relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. Tehran will move to exacerbate the split within the Sunni Arab Gulf States, with senior Iranian officials visiting Qatar more frequently to discuss areas of common interest in undermining the Saudi influence in the region.

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