IRAQ’S new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi pledged to ‘work with all communities in Iraq’ as parliament approved a new government on September 8, 2014.
International demands called for an inclusive government involving disenfranchised Sunni and Kurdish minorities, writes Professor Dr Amatzia Baram. The aim is to bridge divides and halt support for Islamic State (IS - formerly known as ISIS) which has captured large swathes of Iraq and is tearing apart its borders as it seeks to create a caliphate governed by fundamentalist Islamic law.
The United States had made the approval of a unity government a condition for increased military assistance against IS.
The US is hoping the new government can start pulling Iraq back together with a national drive to root out IS militants – a move which can only work if the Sunni community can be persuaded it is in their interests to do so.
But the Shia communities of Iraq and Syria are not the only powerful enemies which IS intends to engage. There is the Saudi regime whose approach to Islam and its international relations are not to IS’s liking. The list of IS’s enemies is long, but the largely Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia comes immediately after the Shia communities.
What is Saudi Arabia’s position in all this? To Riyadh the main enemy is the Iranian giant across the Gulf. All Saudi's strategic calculations hinge on this axis.
Since 2011, Saudi Arabia has been helping the jihadi extremists in Syria in their struggle against the President, Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran’s Arab ally. While Qatar was supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, because it was the enemy of both al-Assad and of Riyadh, the Saudis and the Gulf Emirates were helping Jabhat al-Nusra and IS militia.
American intelligence identified, among the fighters in Syria belonging to the Jabha and IS, Saudi military officers ‘on leave’ serving as trainers and advisors. Saudi money, either coming from the state or contributed by affluent individuals, has provided support to both groups.
The weapons could have come from Libya, eastern Europe, looted Syrian caches or other more shadowy sources.
In early 2013, the Saudis appointed Prince Bandar bin Sultan head of intelligence to better co-ordinate the supply of weapons to Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime. But he faced criticism for backing extreme Islamist groups. In mid-April 2014 he was removed from office as a result of American complaints but also Saudi dissatisfaction with his achievements: he promised a quick victory over Assad’s regime but instead he armed the most radical Islamist element. His actions may eventually come home to roost and threaten the Saudi regime.
By late 2013, the US began to apply pressure on the Saudi government to stop supporting those terrorist organisations and from encouraging young Saudis to go to fight in Syria.
In February 2014, Saudi King Abdullah issued a decree imposing tough punishments on anyone who travelled abroad for jihad or who funded them, or encouraged joining. This was the first sign that the Saudis were changing tack.
Sheikh Ali Abbas al-Hikmi, a member of the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars, issued a fatwa in June 2014 forbidding Muslims from initiating or participating in a Syrian jihad.
All this happened before IS conquered Iraq’s northern city Mosul in June 2014. It may very well be that this was the moment when the Saudi regime realised that its own proteges were likely to spell its doom, and therefore they had no choice but to perform a U-turn.
However, this does not mean that the Saudis are going to support any Shia government in Baghdad with money and weapons, let alone fighting troops on the ground. The reason is simple: the Saudis are bound to mistrust any Shia government because they believe that it will be an Iranian satellite.
Even more problematic for them is the fact that under Mr Maliki, Baghdad had invited Iranian soldiers and militiamen into the capital in order to help protect it from IS. The Saudi role therefore, in the foreseeable future will be to deny IS any financial and military support. As the Saudis see it at the moment, the danger of an IS assault into Saudi territory is minimal. But to be on the safe side, more guards have been deployed to the borders with Iraq and Jordan.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi calculate that before IS reaches Saudi Arabia it would have to go through the almost purely Shia south of Iraq and defeat the troops which Iran would be likely to send.
This would then be an Iranian, not a Saudi problem.
Publication Date:
Wed, 2014-09-17 05:00
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